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DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND
COMMERCIAL TORTS
by
Michael Curry * and Melissa Krakauer**
I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICEs
A. Consumer Standing
N Eckman v. Centennial Savings Bank,1 the Texas Supreme Court ruled
that the defendant in a DTPA suit has the burden to plead and prove the
applicability of the $25,000,000 exception to business consumer status as
an affirmative defense.2 Recognizing that most claimants do not have assets
of $25,000,000 or more, the court reasoned that requiring every DTPA
plaintiff to prove that he or she is not a multimillionaire would be an ineffi-
cient and uneconomical use of judicial resources.3 The court stated further
that imposing the burden of raising and negating the applicability of the
$25,000,000 exception upon every business consumer would be unduly
prejudicial.4
Under the Texas Supreme Court's holding, evidence concerning the con-
sumer's financial status is irrelevant unless the defendant raises the issue.5
Once the issue is raised, such financial information will be discoverable to
* B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality,
Smitbers & Curry, Austin, Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law.
** B.S., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality,
Smithers & Curry, Austin, Texas.
1. 784 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990).
2. Id. at 675-76. The $25,000,000 exception is found in the DTPA definition of a
consumer:
[Ain individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency
of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services,
except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with
assets of $25 million or more.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added by author).
3. 784 S.W.2d at 675. The court quoted DTPA § 17.44 which requires that the Act "be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect con-
sumers ... and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." TEx.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
4. 784 S.W.2d at 675. The court's opinion, issued on rehearing, modified the court's
original holding which required the defendant to raise the issue by special exception; once the
issue was raised, the plaintiff had the burden of proving the exception's inapplicability. 34 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 46, 48-49 (Oct. 26, 1988).
5. 784 S.W.2d at 675.
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determine whether the exception applies.6 The court cautioned that to avoid
prejudicing the jury with evidence of the claimant's financial status, the par-
ties should attempt to resolve the applicability of the exception before trial.7
B. Liability Under the Act
In Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar8 the Dallas court of appeals adopted puffing
as a defense in a DTPA misrepresentation suit.9 Aguilar purchased a new
Mercedes Benz from Autohaus and had numerous problems with the vehi-
cle, including an engine hesitation. Over a three year period, Aguilar took
the car to Autohaus for repairs nineteen times. At trial Aguilar testified that
the Autohaus salesman stated that Mercedes Benz is the best engineered car
in the world, that the car probably would not have mechanical difficulties,
that it probably would need servicing only for oil changes, and that it would
be far superior to what Aguilar had previously driven. Based on this testi-
mony, the trial court found that Autohaus violated DTPA section
17.46(b)(5) and (7). 10 The court of appeals reversed the judgment for Agui-
lar and held that the salesman's statements were mere puffing because they
were "too general to be an actionable misrepresentation."II In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Stewart demonstrated the error of the majority in implying a
puffing defense into the DTPA.12
As recognized by both the majority and the dissent, the DTPA does not
codify the common law. The purpose of the DTPA is to provide a cause of
action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numer-
ous defenses encountered in common law fraud and warranty suits.' 3 The
Texas Supreme Court has consistently rejected all attempts to apply various
common law defenses as impediments to recovery under the DTPA. 14
In justifying its holding, the court of appeals acknowledged that the
DTPA does not mention puffing but seized on the reference to puffing in
Pennington v. Singleton. 5 Pennington's reference to puffing, however, was
6. Id. The court noted that the rules of civil procedure adequately protect against overly
intrusive or frivolous discovery requests.
7. 784 S.W. 2d at 675-76.
8. 794 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ deniedper curiam, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
265 (Jan. 9, 1991).
9. Id. at 462.
10. Id. at 461.
11. Id. at 464-65.
12. Id. at 465-67. The Texas Supreme Court stated that in denying the application for
writ of error it was not approving or disapproving of the court of appeals' analysis of the
puffing issue. Aguilar v. Autohaus, Inc., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 265 (Jan. 9, 1991).
13. Id. at 462, 465 (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)).
14. E.g., Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. 1985) (refusing to imply require-
ment of intent, knowledge, or conscious indifference); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600
(Tex. 1985) (refusing to imply reliance element or intent to deceive); Kennedy v. Sale, 689
S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (rex. 1985) (refusing to imply privity requirement).
15. 606 S.W. 2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980). The court also noted judicial references to puffing
in RRTM Restaurant Corp. v. Keeping, 766 S.W. 2d 804, 807 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied); Parks v. U.S. Home Corp., 652 S.W. 2d 479, 484 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The court also cited Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib.
Corp., 784 F. 2d 674, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1986), which held puffing to be a defense to the DTPA.
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only dicta. In fact, the court emphasized that statements like "excellent,"
"perfect," and "just like new" were actionable under the DTPA.16 Attempt-
ing to distinguish the holding in Pennington, the court of appeals noted that
the representations in Autohaus concerned future performance of the vehicle
as opposed to its present condition.17 As pointed out by the dissent, how-
ever, this distinction is meaningless because representations of future quality
are actionable under the DTPA.18
The dissent articulated that the language of the statute does not support a
puffing or opinion defense because it neither grants a blanket exemption for
opinions nor expressly limits liability to representations of fact.19 DTPA
section 17.46(b)(5) and (7) forbid misrepresentations relating to quality,
characteristics, and benefits of goods and services. 20 These prohibitions do
not specify whether they relate to misrepresentations of fact or of opinion.
In contrast, DTPA section 17.46(b)(8), (11), and (13) are limited to repre-
sentations of fact.21 When the legislature has employed certain terms in
some sections of a statute but not in others, the courts should not imply
those terms where excluded. 22
The dissent correctly noted that the common law rationale for a puffery
defense, that buyers could not reasonably be expected to rely on broad state-
ments of opinion, has no application to the DTPA since reliance is not an
element of recovery under the DTPA.23 Moreover, a representation is false,
misleading, or deceptive under the DTPA if it has the capacity or tendency
to deceive even an ignorant, unthinking, credulous person.24 Therefore, the
proper inquiry is not whether the statement is too general, but rather the
subjective effect on the listener.25 Aguilar testified that he had been misled.
While the majority concluded that the salesman's statements did not "con-
vey any definite implications,"2 6 the fact finder could reasonably have found
that the salesman's statements, general or not, assured Aguilar that the car
would perform dependably.27 The court's holding is plainly contrary to the
position held by many commentators who discredit the puffing defense.28
16. 606 S.W. 2d at 685.
17. 794 S.W. 2d at 464.
18. 794 S.W. 2d at 466-67; Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980); see
Teague v. Bandy, 793 S.W. 2d 50, (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
19. 794 S.W. 2d at 466.
20. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (7) (Vernon 1987).
21. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(8), (11), (13) (Vernon 1987).
22. Smith, 611 S.W.2d at 616.
23. 794 S.W. 2d at 466; Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (reliance not
an element).
24. Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1978).
25. In Pennington the Texas Supreme Court stated that general representations are ac-
tionable. 606 S.W. 2d at 687. The majority in Autohaus construed this to mean that general
representations are sometimes actionable. 794 S.W. 2d at 464.
26. 794 S.W. 2d at 464.
27. Id. at 466.
28. See P. Kens & S. Cochran, Consumer Rights & Remedies §§ 8, 32 (Texas Practice
1983); D. Bragg, P. Maxwell & J. Longley, Texas Consumer Litigation § 5.02, p. 136-37 n. 17
(2d ed. 1983); Comment, 9 Texas Consumer Law Reporter 30, 33 (Feb. 1990); Comment, 9




In the significant decision of Frizzel v. Cook,29 the San Antonio court of
appeals ruled that the Texas Securities Act (TSA)30 does not preempt a con-
sumer's DTPA claim for misrepresentations relating to investment and
counseling services.31 In reaching its holding, the court first encountered the
Texas Supreme Court's opinion in E. F Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood 32
which was withdrawn on rehearing. 33 The first opinion in Youngblood held
that the DTPA was inconsistent with the TSA and did not apply to securi-
ties transactions; 34 however, this holding was dropped from the later opin-
ion.35 The court of appeals in Frizzel correctly held that the withdrawn
opinion in Youngblood was not controlling because unpublished opinions
have no precedential value.36 The court noted that both the DTPA and the
TSA expressly provide for cumulative remedies37 and that the express ex-
emption for securities transactions in the predecessor statute38 to the DTPA
was repealed when the legislature enacted the DTPA.39 The court found no
The "puffing" rule amounts to a seller's privilege to lie his head off, so long as he
says nothing specific, on the theory that no reasonable man would believe him,
or that no reasonable man would be influenced by such talk. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the rule has not been a favored one; and that whenever it can be
found under the circumstances that the buyer reasonably understood that he
was receiving something in the way of assurance as to specific facts, the question
of actionable misrepresentation has been left to the jury.
W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, 757 (5th ed. 1984).
29. 790 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
30. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (Vernon 1986).
31. 790 S.W.2d at 47.
32. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 508 (June 24, 1987); see Curry, Commercial Torts and Deceptive
Trade Practices, 42 SW. L. J. 171, 175-77 (1988).
33. 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1987).
34. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 510.
35. 741 S.W.2d at 364.
36. 790 S.W.2d at 43; see Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W. 2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983).
37. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon 1987) (permits cumulative reme-
dies); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33M (Vernon Supp. 1991) (allows all common law
and statutory actions outside Texas Securities Act to remain intact).
38. Article 5069 - 10.03, Interest - Consumer Credit - Consumer Protection Act, Ch. 274,
§ 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Law 608, 658. "Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to actions or transac-
tions permitted under laws administered by a public official acting under statutory authority of
this State or the United States."
39. Section 17.49 of the DTPA contains the only exemptions to the Act and contains no
securities exemption. It provides:
(a) Nothing in this subehapter shall apply to the owner or employees of a
regularly published newspaper, magazine, or telephone directory, or broadcast
station, or billboard, wherein any advertisement in violation of this subchapter is
published or disseminated, unless it is established that the owner or employees
of the advertising medium have knowledge of the false, deceptive, or misleading
acts or practices declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, or had a direct or
substantial financial interest in the sale or distribution of the unlawfully adver-
tised good or service. Financial interest as used in this section relates to an
expectation which would be the direct result of such advertisement.
(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall apply to acts or practices authorized
under specific rules or regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion under § 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.A.
45(a)(1)]. The provisions of this subchapter do apply to any act or practice
prohibited or not specifically authorized by a rule or regulation of the Federal
Trade Commission. An act or practice is not specifically authorized if no rule or
regulation has been issued on the act or practice.
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inconsistency between the TSA with its due diligence defense and the
DTPA.4° If a conflict between the two statutes existed however, the DTPA
would control because it is the later enacted statute.4 1 The court concluded
that any implied exemption for securities from the DTPA would be im-
proper inasmuch as the Texas Supreme Court had refused to imply exemp-
tions or exceptions not mandated by the legislature. 42
C. Damages
Although the issue has not yet been addressed by the Texas Supreme
Court, most of the courts of appeals that have considered the issue of
whether prejudgment interest is subject to trebling under the DTPA have
held that it is not.43 The rationale of these cases is that although the con-
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49 (Vernon 1987).
40. 790 S.W.2d at 45. The due diligence defense in the TSA provides in part: "[A] person
is not liable if he sustains the burden of proof that either (a) the buyer knew of the untruth or
omission or (b) he (the offeror or seller) did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the untruth or omission." TEx. Rnv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
33A(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The court found that part (a) of the due diligence defense is
subsumed.within the TSA requirement that a deceptive practice constitutes a producing cause
of actual damages. See Tsx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987). The court
concluded that part (b) of the due diligence defense was very similar to the DTPA third party
information defense in § 17.506 (a)(2). That section provides a defense to a defendant who
gave the consumer written notice of his reliance upon "written information... obtained from
another source if the information was false or inaccurate and the defendant did not know and
could not reasonably have known of the falsity or inaccuracy of the information." TEx. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.506 (a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
The court might have added that even if the DTPA requires compliance with a more strin-
gent standard than does the TSA, the statutes are not irreconcilable. A party who meets the
DTPA standard also will comply with the TSA.
41. The Government Code provides that "[e]xcept as provided by § 311.031(d), if statutes
enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest
in date of enactment prevails." TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.025(a) (Vernon 1988).
The legislature amended and reenacted DTPA § 17.43 in 1979, two years after the legisla-
ture enacted TSA's due diligence defense. The court held, therefore, that DTPA § 17.43 con-
trols. 790 S.W. 2d at 45. DTPA § 17.43 states:
The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The remedies provided in
this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for
in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted under
both this subchapter and another law of both actual damages and penalties for
the same act or practice. A violation of a provision of law other than this sub-
chapter is not in and of itself a violation of this subchapter. An act or practice
that is a violation of a provision of law other than this subchapter may be made
the basis of an action under this subchapter if the act orpractice is proscribed by a
provision of this subchapter or is declared by such other law to be actionable under
this subchapter. The provisions of this subchapter do not in any way preclude
other political subdivisions of this state from dealing with deceptive trade
practices.
TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon 1987) (italicized language added by author
represents the 1979 amendment). The court concluded that this amendment demonstrated
legislative intent that the DTPA not be displaced by other statutes pertaining to the same
conduct.
42. 790 S.W.2d at 46; see Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W. 2d 349, 354 (Tex.
1987) ("The legislative history of the DTPA indicates that the Act was intended to apply to all
service providers.").
43. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., Inc. v. Leong, 750 S.W.2d 791, 798 (rex. App.-El
Paso 1988, writ denied) (disallowing trebling); Hope v. Allstate Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 634, 638
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
sumer's damages may have been caused by the defendant's statutory viola-
tion, the lost use of those damage funds was not.44 This view, however,
cannot be reconciled with the fact that but for the statutory violation, the
consumer would not have been deprived of the use of the funds representing
the damages. Thus, judicial reticience to the trebling of prejudgment interest
is not supported by the policies underlying the DTPA.
In a tightly-written opinion which bucks the trend, the Austin court of
appeals held that prejudgment interest recoverable pursuant to common law,
rather than by statute or contract, constitutes actual damages subject to treb-
ling.45 Recognizing that actual damages recoverable under the DTPA are
those damages recoverable at common law, 46 the court relied on the long
standing rule that interest as "compensation for detention of that which is
due on account of injury inflicted" 47 constitutes common law damages.48
Such interest thus constitutes actual damages under the DTPA, which may
be trebled in appropriate cases.49 As a cautionary word, it is important to
remember that the court will award prejudgment interest as actual damages
only if it is specifically pleaded.50
II. COMMERCIAL TORTS
A. Fraud
Eleven years after a statutory amendment should have settled the issue,5 1
the Texas Supreme Court confirmed in Williams v. Khalaf5 2 that the limita-
tions period in fraud actions is four years.53 Although no limitations statute
expressly applies to fraud,5 4 the court has long treated fraud as an action on
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disallowing trebling); Precision Homes, Inc.
v. Cooper, 671 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(disallowing trebling); Rotello v. Ring Around Products, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455, 463 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disallowing trebling). But see Indus-Ri-
Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no
writ) (allowing trebling).
44. Precision Homes, 671 S.W. 2d at 930-31; Rotello, 614 S.W. 2d at 463; Hope, 719 S.W.
2d at 638; Group Medical, 750 S.W. 2d at 798.
45. Paramore v. Nehring, 792 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
46. Id. at 212 (citing Brown v. American Transfer & Storage, 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.
1980)).
47. 792 S.W.2d at 212 (citing Watkins v. Junker, 90 Tex. 584, 40 S.W. 11 (1897)).
48. In Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc. the Texas Supreme Court examined the
two types of interest recognized by the law:
The term "interest" encompasses two distinct forms of compensation: inter-
est as interest (eo nomine) and interest as damages. Interest as interest is com-
pensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or detention of
money. (citation omitted) Interest as damages is compensation allowed by law
as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse
of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.
696 S.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Tex. 1985).
49. 792 S.W.2d at 212. At the time Paramore was tried, treble damages were mandatory.
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1977).
50. Benavidez v. Isles Constr. Co., 726 S.W. 2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987).
51. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
52. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 133 (Dec. 1, 1990).
53. Id. at 137.
54. Id. at 134.
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a debt for limitations purposes 5 5 Before 1979, two statutes of limitation
specifically applied to debts: a four-year period applied to debts evidenced in
writing and a two-year period applied to debts not evidenced in writing.5 6 In
1979 the legislature amended the two statutes to eliminate this distinction
and to list all actions for debt under the four-year statute.5 7 Accordingly,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment, determin-
ing that the court erroneously applied a two-year limitations period to Mr.
William's fraud counterclaim. 58
The Williams opinion goes into considerable detail in explaining the his-
torical basis for treating fraud claims as actions on a debt as opposed to
trespass actions, which would fall under the two-year statute.5 9 Briefly, the
court explains that, unlike most torts, the cause of action for fraud or deceit
did not develop from the common law action for trespass.6 0 Rather, the
fraud action evolved from the action for assumpsit which was contractual or
quasi-contractual in nature and involved a claim of debt.6 1 The fraud action
seeking to rescind a contract for fraudulent inducement is an exception since
no damages are sought and it is thus not an action on a debt.62 Nevertheless,
the court found that this action is governed by the four-year "residual" limi-
tations provision.63
55. See Gordon v. Rhodes & Daniel, 102 Tex. 300, 116 S.W. 40, 42 (1909); Blondeau v.
Summer, 139 S.W. 2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1940, writ ref'd).
56. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5527 (1925) (four-year statute); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art.
5526 (1925) (two-year statute).
57. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986). Section 16.004 pro-
vides in part:
Four-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit on the following actions not later than four years
after the day the cause of action accrues:
(1) specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real property;
(2) penalty or damages on the penal clause of a bond to convey real property; or
(3) debt.
TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a) (Vernon 1986).
58. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 133.
59. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) provides:
Two-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the prop-
erty of another, conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the per-
sonal property of another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer, and
forcible detainer not later than two years after the day the cause of action
accrues.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of
action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action
accrues on the death of the injured person
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a), (b) (Vernon 1986).
60. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 134-36.
61. Id. at 135-36.
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id. The general limitations or residual provision states that for all actions for which
there is no express limitations period, the statute of limitations is four years. See Tax. Civ.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
1991]
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B. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Viles v. Security National Insurance Co. 64the Viles claimed under their
homeowners insurance policy for damages to their home's foundation
caused by a shower pan leak. Although they gave their insurance agent
prompt notice of their loss, they failed to file a sworn proof of loss within the
91-day period provided by the insurance policy. Within the 91-day period,
however, the insurance company denied the Viles' claim on the ground that
the foundation damage was due to a leak which predated the inception of the
policy. 65 The Viles then sued the insurance company for breach of contract
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and secured a favorable
judgment based upon the latter theory. The court of appeals reversed the
district court's judgment holding that the Viles' failure to obtain a jury find-
ing that their proof of loss had been timely filed, or its filing waived, disal-
lowed any recovery for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.66
The appellate court reasoned that, absent a finding of compliance with the
policy, the insurance company had a reasonable basis for denial of the
claim.6 7
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.68
The court held that an insured's failure to file a proof of loss within the time
period prescribed by the insurance policy did not automatically bar an ac-
tion for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.69 The court rea-
soned that an insurer's breach of its duty to act in good faith and to deal
fairly with its insured gives rise to a cause of action in tort which is separate
from the contract action for breach of the insurance policy.70 Accordingly,
compliance with the insurance contract is not an element of the tort cause of
action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.71 The court
noted, however, that compliance with the contract conditions may have evi-
dentiary relevance to the tort action since the basis of an action for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is the absence of a reasonable basis for
the denial of a claim; in some cases failure to comply with the policy may
establish a reasonable basis for claim denial.7 2
The Texas Supreme Court also held that whether a reasonable basis for
denial of a claim exists is to be judged from the facts available to the insurer
at the time of claim denial.7 3 This holding is significant. Under this analy-
sis, if an insurance company denies a claim without a reasonable basis for
64. 788 S.W. 2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
65. There were actually several policies issued by three insurance companies involved in
the case. For convenience, all of the companies will be collectively referred to in the singular.
66. 788 S.W.2d at 566.
67. Id. at 567.
68. Id. at 568.




73. 788 S.W.2d at 567. The court held that since the insurance company denied the Viles'
claim prior to the expiration of the 91-day period, the failure to file the proof of loss could not
have been a reasonable basis for the denial. Id. at 568.
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doing so, then it has breached its duty of good faith even though it later
recognizes or discovers a bona fide basis for denying the claim.74 The court
reasoned that this policy would promote the thorough investigation of
claims prior to any denial.7"
In a concurring opinion, four justices agreed that the insurance company's
denial within the 91-day period established waiver of the proof of loss re-
quirement as a matter of law; accordingly, the failure to obtain a jury finding
on this issue was not fatal to the tort cause of action.76 The concurring
justices disagreed, however, with the majority's holding that the tort claim
for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was always separate
from the contract claim for breach of the policy of insurance.7 7 The concur-
ring opinion stated that it was unnecessary to decide that issue but gave
implicit support for the view that a breach of contract was an element of the
tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.78 The con-
curring justices also disagreed with the majority's view that the reasonable-
ness of the claim denial must always be judged by the facts before the insurer
at the time of the denial.79 In the concurring justices' view, a reasonable
basis may exist for the denial of a claim even though the grounds actually
relied upon by the company were invalid.80
Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Ina8 1 involved a claim by Debra Murray
on a medical insurance policy provided by her husband's employer. Murray
had been covered as a dependent, but after she initiated divorce proceedings
her husband requested the administrator, San Jacinto Agency (SJA), to drop
her from the policy. Due to that request, on September 5, 1984 the adminis-
trator refused to verify coverage for medical treatment sought by Murray.
SJA reversed its position on March 15, 1985, admitting that its denial of
coverage had been unwarranted. Murray filed suit against SJA on March
27, 1986, but service of citation was not effected until January 4, 1987. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SJA on the ground that
limitations had run.82 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the two-
year limitations period applied and that Murray's suit did not toll limita-
74. See Viles, 788 S.W. 2d at 569 (Hecht, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 568. The court's opinion rejected "permitting the insurer to justify on any basis,
no matter how technical and as late as trial, its failure to make a thorough investigation prior
to denial of a claim." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 569.
78. Id. The concurring justices cited Justice Gonzalez's concurring opinion in Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W. 2d 165, 168 (rex. 1987), wherein it was sug-
gested that breach of contract was an element of the good faith tort action.
79. 788 S.W. 2d at 569.
80. The concurring opinion considered the majority's holding to be in conflict with
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W. 2d 210 (rex. 1988), wherein the Texas Supreme
Court opined that the existence of a reasonable basis for claim denial required "an objective
determination of whether a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have
delayed or denied the claimant's benefits." Id. at 213. The majority's opinion, however, is not
inconsistent with Aranda but merely requires that the hypothetical actions of the reasonable
insurer be judged in light of the facts known at the time of denial.
81. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. 3. 404 (April 18, 1990).
82. Id. at 405.
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tions, because she had not exercised due diligence in effecting service.8 3
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and, in the course of its opinion modified the limitations rules announced in
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 84 for actions involving
good faith and fair dealing claims.8 5 In Arnold, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the two-year limitations period did not begin to run "until the
underlying insurance contract claims are finally resolved."186 Murray argued
that, under Arnold, limitations on her good faith and fair dealing claim did
not start until SJA resolved the claim by acknowledging its mistake on
March 15, 1985 which occurred within two years of the date citation was
served. This argument failed when the court replaced the Arnold limitations
rule with a new rule: limitations for a good faith and fair dealing claim
commences on the date that the claim is denied.8 7 The court reasoned that
this new formulation brought Arnold claims in line with the general rule that
limitations commences when facts exist which authorize a claimant to seek
judicial relief.88
Although Murray filed suit within two years of the date SJA denied cover-
age, she did not complete service of citation for another ten months. The
court remanded the case to the trial court to give Murray an opportunity to
prove diligence in attempting service.8 9 Four justices dissented, arguing
that the majority had not offered sufficient justification for overturning such
recent precedent as Arnold.90 In the dissenters' view, the new limitations
rule would force plaintiffs to prematurely file good faith and fair dealing
claims to toll limitations.91
Perhaps more intriguing than the debate over the commencement of the
limitations period in good faith and fair dealing claims is the question of
whether the court's choice of limitations statutes was correct. In Murray the
Texas Supreme Court held, without discussion, that the two-year limitations
period found in section 16.003 (a) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies
Code controlled.92 This conclusion must be reexamined in light of the
83. Id. at 407.
84. 725 S.W. 2d 165 (rex. 1987).
85. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 405-06.
86. 725 S.W. 2d at 168.
87. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 406. The court noted, however, that when there is no outright
denial of the claim, the date limitations commences becomes a question of fact. The court
stated, "clearly, though, if an insurance company strings an insured along without denying or
paying a claim, limitations will be tolled." Id.
88. Id.; see Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W. 2d 18, 19 (Tex. 1977).
89. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 407.
90. Id. at 407-08. The dissent also pointed out that the court had previously recognized
exceptions to the general limitations rule embraced by the majority; in the dissent's view, an
exception was warranted in good faith and fair dealing cases as well.
91. Id. at 408. This problem may be mitigated somewhat by § 16.068 of the Texas Civil
Practices and Remedies Code which tolls limitations as of the filing of the suit for any new
cause of action later added to the suit, provided it arises out of the same transaction or occur-
rence. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 1986).
92. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 406. Section 16.003 (a) provides:
A person must bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the property
of another, conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the personal
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court's holding in Williams v. Khalaf 93 that an action for fraud is consid-
ered, for limitations purposes, as an action for debt governed by the four-
year limitations period.94 It would certainly seem that a claim for damages
resulting from a failure to pay insurance proceeds, when there is no reason-
able basis for denial, has the characteristics of an action for debt.95 More-
over, since nothing in the two-year limitations provision relates to an action
for good faith and fair dealing,96 the court apparently selected the wrong
limitations provision. The court's analysis in Williams suggests that a good
faith and fair dealing action should be governed by the four-year limitations
period.97 This approach would have the added benefit of providing a uni-
form limitations time frame for actions on the insurance contract and tort
actions under Arnold.
C. Tortious Interference
In Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc.98 the Texas
Supreme Court reviewed a number of tortious interference claims stemming
from a covenant not to compete. 99 Fowler and Welch entered into a con-
tract by which Welch agreed to conduct a fund-raising campaign for the
benefit of Fowler. Welch then contracted John W. Butler Companies, Inc.
("Butler") to help execute the campaign. The contract between Fowler and
Welch contained a notice provision for termination in the event either party
became dissatisfied with the other's performance.
Additionally, the contract between Welch and Butler contained a cove-
nant not to compete which prohibited Butler from entering into any form of
contract for services with any of Welch's clients for two years following the
conclusion of the Welch-Butler contract. Fowler eventually became dissatis-
fied with Welch's performance and terminated its contract. Similarly, Butler
and Welch became dissatisfied with one another, and Butler terminated its
contract. Subsequently, the president i ° of Butler Companies, John Butler,
was hired by an affiliate of Fowler's and took over supervising the Fowler
fund-raising campaign. Welch sued Fowler for interfering with the Welch-
Butler contract and sued Butler for interfering with the Fowler-Welch
contract.
Addressing the Welch-Butler contract, the court first determined that the
property of another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer, and forcible
detainer not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.
TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986).
93. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 133 (November 28, 1990).
94. Id. at 134; see supra notes 51-63.
95. See Williams, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 136. In Williams the court explained that the
cause of action for fraud developed as a quasi-contractual cause of action-a hybrid of the
original actions for debt and account. Id. at 135-36.
96. Autohaus, Inc. v. Aguilar, 794 S.W.2d 459, 464-65 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ).
97. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
98. 793 S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. 1990).
99. Id.




noncompetition prohibition was absolute, unequivocal and unreasonable 0 1
and held that the clause as written constituted an unreasonable restraint on
trade and was unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 10 2 The court
noted that mere unenforceability of a contract is not a defense to an action
for tortious interference. 10 3 Covenants not to compete, however, which are
unreasonable restraints on trade and unenforceable on grounds of public pol-
icy cannot form the basis of an action for tortious interference."14 Accord-
ingly, the court held that Fowler had a valid defense against Welch's tortious
interference claim. 105
The Texas Supreme Court also ruled upon Welch's claim that Butler tor-
tiously interfered with the Fowler-Welch contract. The court held that the
mere fact that the contract was terminable upon notice would not provide a
defense to the action.'0 6 The court agreed with Welch that since Texas law
protects both existing and prospective contracts from interference, 10 7 an ex-
isting contract which is terminable upon notice should be given similar pro-
tection.' 0 8 The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent to leave
contracts that are terminable upon notice unprotected while protecting rela-
tions that are more or less complete or definitive.1°9 Ultimately, however,
the court concluded that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding
that Butler had interfered with the Fowler-Welch contract.1 10 The court
noted that merely inducing a party to exercise a right to terminate contrac-
tual relations after giving the required notice does not necessarily constitute
tortious interference under Texas law.11 '
101. Id. at 663; see De Santis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W. 2d 670, 681-83 (Tex. 1990)
(criteria for enforceable covenants not to compete).
102. 793 S.W. 2d at 663.
103. Id. at 664 (citing Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W. 2d 818, 821 (Tex. 1969)). In Cle-
ments the contract at issue was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, but it was not void
or illegal or against public policy. Even though the contract was unenforceable, it could serve
as the basis for a tortious interference claim. Id.
104. 793 S.W. 2d at 665.
105. Id. at 663.
106. Id. at 666.
107. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W. 2d 686, 689 (rex. 1989).
108. 793 S.W. 2d at 665.
109. Id. at 666; see Champion v. Wright, 740 S.W. 2d 848, 854 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, writ denied). Complete or definitive relations include contracts with fixed terms, termi-
nable-at-will contracts, and prospective business relations.
110. 793 S.W. 2d at 666. The court stated, "The decision to hire John Butler... was not
dependent upon the termination of the Fowler-Welch contract and the termination of the
Fowler-Welch contract was not dependent upon John Butler's hiring." Id.
111. Id. at 667; see Kingsbery v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 315 S.W. 2d 561, 576 (rex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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